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Teens and Traﬃc Safety
Thomas S. Dee and William N. Evans
Hollywood has always portrayed teens and cars as a volatile mixture.
Whether it was the game of chicken from Rebel without a Cause, the drag
race in American Graﬃti, or the misadventures with dad’s car in Risky Bus-
iness and Ferris Bueller’s Day Oﬀ, a teen behind the wheel of a car has al-
ways moved the plot along to some calamitous event. Although movies are
sometimes a poor barometer of what ails society, unfortunately in this case
these depictions may not be too far from the truth. In 1997 alone, there
were 10,208 motor-vehicle fatalities among young adults aged ﬁfteen to
twenty-four,accountingforroughlyone-thirdofalldeathsinthisagegroup.
Motor-vehicle fatalities are far and away the leading cause of death among
young adults.
The large fraction of deaths among young adults attributed to car travel
is not entirely unexpected. Driving is an inherently risky activity, and the
young rarely die of other nonviolent causes.1 Furthermore, teens are in-
creasingly dependent on automobiles. In 1995, the average teen aged six-
teen to nineteen traveled 11,500 miles in cars, many of them as the driver.
This number is nearly double the value for 1983, when teens traveled an
average of only 5,861 miles per year in cars.2 However, although a certain
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1. In 1997, accidents of all forms, homicides and other legal interventions, and suicides
accounted for 24,797 of the 31,544 deaths of young adults.
2. Authors’ calculations based on data from the 1983 and 1995 National Personal Trans-
portation Survey.
121amount of traﬃc-related injury and death is to be expected, teens die at a
rate far higher than do older drivers. The teen motor-vehicle-fatality rate
(deﬁned as deaths per 100,000 people) is nearly double the rate for adults
aged twenty-ﬁve and up. When fatalities are denominated by miles of
travel, this ratio is nearly 2.5. Part of this diﬀerence is almost surely due
to the lack of driving experience among teens. For example, compared to
older drivers, teens are much more likely to die as occupants in accidents
where general driver error is the cause, such as single-vehicle crashes and
vehicle rollovers. However, much of the diﬀerence in rates across age
groups is due speciﬁcally to the fact that teens tend to take more risks than
do older drivers. In a recent National Highway Traﬃc Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA) telephone survey, 60 percent of teen drivers reported that
they were more likely to pass other cars than to be passed, 16 percentage
points higher than the number for twenty-ﬁve- to thirty-four-year-olds and
more than twice the rate for adults thirty-ﬁve to forty-four.3 In the same
survey, 67 percent of teens said that they tended to keep up with faster cars
when driving in heavy traﬃc, a slightly lower rate than that for twenty-one-
to twenty-four-year-olds (69 percent) but substantially higher than the re-
sponses for twenty-ﬁve- to thirty-four- and thirty-ﬁve- to forty-four-year-
olds (58 and 48 percent, respectively). Nearly all studies have found that
young people, and males in particular, were the most likely to be involved
in fall-asleep crashes (Pack et al. 1995; Horne and Reyner 1995). Teens
are also less likely than adults are to use an important traﬃc-safety device,
a seat belt. Data from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) indicate
that, nationally, belt-use rates are about 10 percentage points higher for
adults than for teens aged eighteen and nineteen. Finally, nearly one-
quarter of all teen car-occupant fatalities are alcohol related, with the vast
majority of these cases being single-vehicle crashes. Interestingly, the frac-
tion of alcohol involvement for adults aged twenty-ﬁve and older is only 4
percentage points higher than that for teens, although all states now have a
minimum legal drinking age of twenty-one.
In this chapter, we examine four broad questions about teen traﬃc
safety: How has teen traﬃc safety changed in the past twenty-ﬁve years,
and what are the possible causes of these changes? Why are teen drivers
worse than adults? Who are the bad teen drivers? Which government poli-
cies have inﬂuenced teen traﬃc safety? These are by no means an exhaus-
tive set of questions, but, given the trends in travel patterns and govern-
ment regulation, we believe that we have isolated a number of interesting
results that shed light on this risky and highly costly aspect of teen behav-
ior. Our task for this project was made simpler by the extraordinary num-
ber of data sets available that include information about teen traﬃc safety
3. Results of the NHTSA aggressive driving survey can be found at http://www.nhtsa.dot.
gov/people/injury/aggressive/unsafe/att-beh/Chapt4.html#1.
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sets, including the Fatal Accident Reporting System, the National Per-
sonal Transportation Survey, the National Automotive Sampling Survey,
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey, the Youth Risk Behavioral
Surveillance Survey, and the NHTSA 19 City Survey. We supplemented
these sources with demographic data at the state level about the size of the
teen population as well as other basic demographic data. We also utilized
a number of published sources to isolate the timing of several important
state policy changes.
The paper has three main sections. In section 3.1, we summarize the
traits and trends in teen traﬃc safety. In section 3.2, we identify the ob-
served characteristics of risky teen drivers by examining self-reports of
hazardous driving practices. Finally, in section 3.3, we look at a number
of important state policies that have been adopted over the past twenty-
ﬁve years that have important ramiﬁcations for teen traﬃc safety. This
discussion focuses, in particular, on four classes of state-level policies: poli-
cies that inﬂuence youth access to alcohol; policies directed at the speciﬁc
and general deterrence of drunk driving; mandatory seat-belt laws; and
highway speed limits. In the ﬁnal section, we summarize our ﬁndings on
this important dimension of risky teen behavior.
3.1 Teen Traﬃc Fatalities—Traits, Trends, and Hypotheses
3.1.1 Teen Traﬃc Fatalities—Historical and Cross-Sectional Data
To help focus our discussion, we ﬁrst present cross-sectional and time-
series evidence of the demographics of teen traﬃc safety. Our goal is to
provide some evidence about the characteristics of traﬃc accidents that
involve teens, who gets into accidents, and how key factors have changed
over time. In this section, we focus on one particular type of traﬃca c c i -
dent, namely, that which produces fatalities. This decision will obviously
capture only one dimension of teen driving, and, clearly, there are other
types of costs generated by such accidents. More speciﬁcally, the morbid-
ity and property damage generated by traﬃc accidents involving teens are
not trivial. Our decision is, however, guided by the relative importance of
traﬃc fatalities and by the availability of high-quality, nationally represen-
tative data on motor-vehicle fatalities over a long period of time.
The primary data set used to construct the numerator in a motor-
vehicle-fatality rate is the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS). The
FARS is a census of motor accidents resulting in an occupant or a nonmo-
torist fatality within thirty days of the accident. The FARS collects data
that describe the accident, the vehicle, all the persons involved, and the
drivers. The FARS is administered by the NHTSA, and data are collected
at the state level by FARS analysts, who utilize such information as police
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and hospital and emergency-room reports as well as other sources. Data
are available beginning in 1975.
We begin the analysis by presenting, in table 3.1, the distribution of
motor-vehicle deaths in 1998 for three age groups: teens sixteen to nine-
teen; young adults twenty to twenty-four; and adults twenty-ﬁve and older.
This table provides a useful backdrop for establishing important stylized
facts and for exploring what might constitute meaningful measures of teen
traﬃc-fatality rates. Of the 4,643 motor-vehicle fatalities among teens in
1998, the vast majority are vehicle occupants, with almost 89 percent being
fatalities among car occupants.4 Nonoccupant deaths in all age categories
are predominately among pedestrians. Adults have a much smaller frac-
tion of car-occupant deaths than do younger people because a larger frac-
tion of adults deaths occur in commercial trucks. Given the preponder-
ance of teen deaths in cars, we present in the bottom portion of the table
the fraction of all car-occupant deaths in particular groups. In all groups,
the majority of deaths are among males, but this gender diﬀerential is
higher among younger populations. There are a number of other intriguing
results that also signal the relative prevalence of risk taking among teen
drivers. First, teens have low belt-use rates, and they are more likely to be




Type of Fatality/Group 16–19 20–24 25
Motor-vehicle fatalities 4,643 4,853 28,880
% motor-vehicle occupants 93.3 91.7 84.1
% car occupants 88.8 82.7 74.6
Among car occupants (%):
Males 65.1 74.2 61.8
Used seat belt 28.7 26.4 38.2
In car with air bag 17.4 21.4 23.6
Driver 59.7 68.1 75.6
Alcohol was involved 25.8 48.9 29.8
Friday/Saturday accident 35.3 36.0 33.4
Nighttime accident 52.8 61.7 36.5
Accident on Friday/Saturday night 20.9 23.9 13.8
By type of incident:
Multivehicle 41.6 39.1 57.5
Single vehicle 43.6 46.4 31.9
Noncollision 14.8 14.5 10.6
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4. We deﬁne car occupants as people in cars, vans, minivans, sport-utility vehicles, and
light trucks.in a car without an air bag relative to the older adults. Second, one-quarter
of all teen deaths are alcohol related.5 This rate is surprisingly only 4 per-
centage points lower than the rate for adults even though all states have
adopted minimum legal drinking ages of twenty-one. For adults, three-
quarters of car-occupant deaths are drivers. However, among teens, fewer
than 60 percent are drivers, indicating that teens are substantially more
likely to be passengers in fatal accidents. In the case of teens, most passen-
ger fatalities occur in cars driven by other teens. The fraction of fatalities
that happen on a Friday or Saturday is similar across age groups. However,
teen traﬃc fatalities are more concentrated during the nighttime. Likewise,
one-ﬁfth of teen car-occupant fatalities happen on a Friday or Saturday
night, compared to roughly one-sixth of adult deaths. Certain types of ve-
hicle accidents are more likely to be caused by driver error than are oth-
ers. For example, it is easier to assign driver blame in single-vehicle crashes
and noncollision accidents like vehicle rollovers. Teens are much more
likely to be involved in these types of crashes than are adults. About 60
percent of teen occupant deaths are single-vehicle crashes or noncollision
accidents like rollovers, compared to just over 40 percent for adults.
In ﬁgure 3.1, we report the time series of motor-vehicle-accident rates
for the three age groups over the period 1975–97. A fatality rate should
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5. The NHTSA deﬁnes a traﬃc-related fatality as alcohol involved if anyone involved in
the accident has a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.01 or more. BAC measures the
weight of alcohol in a given volume of blood (grams per deciliter) and can be identiﬁed
through an evaluation of breath, blood, urine, or saliva. Since BAC data are not available
for all participants in fatal accidents, the NHTSA imputes some data.
Fig. 3.1 Motor-vehicle-fatality ratecontrol for the underlying exposure of the population to risk. In this case,
we use a simple measure of exposure, namely, fatalities per 100,000 people
in the given age group. Population is a coarse measure of exposure to risk
since driving intensity may vary considerably across age groups. But, given
the lack of data on miles of travel by time and age, we start with this
admittedly restrictive measure. The numbers in ﬁgure 3.1 demonstrate that
the teen vehicle-fatality rate is roughly comparable to that for adults aged
twenty to twenty-four and that both are about twice as large as the rate
for adults aged twenty-ﬁve and older. The time-series pattern in all three
series is similar, showing a large increase in rates during the late 1970s, a
rapid decline in fatalities during the 1980s recession, a slight increase in
rates through 1986, then a steady decline in rates until 1992. After 1992,
fatality rates have been relatively constant. The long-term decline in teen
fatality rates since the peak value in 1979 is stunning. Between 1979 and
1997, traﬃc-fatality rates for teens fell by 37 percent. Much of the drop
occurred over the period 1986–92, when rates fell 25 percent. The drop in
teen fatality rates is much larger than the drop for adults aged twenty-ﬁve
and older, where fatality rates fell by 22 percent in the period 1979–97 and
by 13 percent between 1986 and 1992. In ﬁgure 3.2, we report single-age
fatality rates for teens aged sixteen to nineteen over the same period. The
general time-series pattern is very similar to that reported in ﬁgure 3.1
above, with rates declining for all age groups after 1986. In general, these
rates are monotonically higher for older drivers. However, this diﬀerence
has converged over time with particularly strong reductions in traﬃc fatali-
ties among older teens.
The motor-vehicle-fatality rate includes many type of victims, including
drivers, occupants, passengers on public transportation, pedestrians, bik-
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Fig. 3.2 Motor-vehicle-fatality rates for teensers, etc. The results shown in table 3.1 above illustrated that teen motor-
vehicle fatalities are primarily from accidents involving the family car, but,
in comparison to older adults, there are a higher fraction of nondriver-
occupant deaths among teens. Therefore, a measure that may more accu-
rately reﬂect risk taking by teens is the prevalence of fatalities in passenger
vehicles. Using data from the FARS for the years 1975–97, we construct
passenger-vehicle-fatality rates for each of the three age groups. In ﬁgures
3.3 and 3.4, we repeat the structure of the two previous graphs using
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Fig. 3.3 Passenger-car-occupant-fatality rates
Fig. 3.4 Passenger-car-occupant-fatality rates among teenspassenger-vehicle-fatality rates as the outcome. Since teen fatalities are
heavily concentrated among passenger-vehicle occupants, the trends and
relative magnitudes of changes for this outcome are roughly comparable
tothe motor-vehicledeathrate numbersinﬁgures 3.1and 3.2above. Incon-
trast, the drop in occupant fatalities among adults twenty-ﬁve and older
is less dramatic (17 percent) than that in the total vehicle fatality rate (22
percent).
As suggested earlier, denominating fatality rates with population is a
coarse way in which to measure exposure to risks. The risks could vary
considerably across groups if, for example, the types of roads, the types of
travel, or the amount of travel varies across groups. Unfortunately, detailed
data about these factors are sparse, and, therefore, we can view changes in
fatality rates that are deﬁned by diﬀerent denominators only for particular
years. More speciﬁcally, we can produce relatively detailed and age-
speciﬁc estimates of car travel by relying on data from the National Per-
sonal Transportation Survey (NPTS).6 The NPTS is a nationally represen-
tative survey of U.S. households. The NPTS is sponsored by the Federal
Highway Administration and has been conducted in 1969, 1977, 1983,
1990, and 1995. In this chapter, we employ data from the three most recent
surveys. Information is collected for all household members aged ﬁve and
older. Data for children ﬁve to thirteen were reported by a household
adult, and persons fourteen and older were interviewed directly. Informa-
tion was collected about all trips taken by surveyed household members
during a designated twenty-four-hour period (the “travel day” ﬁle) and
about trips of seventy-ﬁve miles or more taken during the preceding
fourteen-day period (the “travel period” ﬁle). The survey collected data
on mode of transportation, trip purpose, distance, and time of trip. These
values are used to construct aggregate estimates of annual travel. In 1995,
data were collected from about forty-two thousand households. Roughly
twenty-two thousand households were interviewed in 1990 and roughly
sixty-four hundred in 1983.
From the day-trip data ﬁle, we calculated the distance of motor-vehicle
trips in personal vehicles for all respondents. Using the sample weights,
we then calculated the annual miles of car travel by age for the 1983, 1990,
and 1995 surveys. We then constructed age-speciﬁc car-occupant-fatality
rates for these years using vehicle miles of travel as the denominator. These
results are reported in table 3.2. In the ﬁrst columns, we report per capita
vehicle miles of travel by age group for the three survey years. Notice that,
for all three years of data, teens have much lower miles of car travel than
do adults. In 1983, for example, adults twenty-ﬁve and older had 36 per-
cent more per capita miles of travel than did teens. These results suggest
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6. A detailed description of and data for the NPTS can be found at http://www.bts.gov/
ntda/npts.that conventional population-based fatality rates (e.g., ﬁg. 3.3) vastly un-
derstate the diﬀerence in fatality risks across age groups. In 1983, for ex-
ample, the ratio of age sixteen to nineteen to age twenty-ﬁve and older
vehicle-occupant-fatality rates when rates are constructed using popula-
tion is 2.2, but the ratio is just slightly over 3.0 when rates are constructed
by vehicles of travel. The disparity in vehicle miles of travel across age
groups fell considerably over the next twelve years. Between 1983 and
1995, per capita vehicle miles of travel increased from 5,861 to 11,498 for
teens, a jump of 96 percent. In contrast, per capita miles of travel increased
by only 69 percent for adults twenty-ﬁve and older. This implies that the
population-denominated rates in ﬁgure 3.1 above understate the consid-
erable gains in traﬃc safety among teens. To see this in more detail, in
table 3.3 we report the change in fatality rates by age group for the peri-
ods 1983–95 and 1990–95. We report the change in rates for both the
population- and the miles-denominated fatality rates. Notice that, using
Table 3.3 Percentage Changes in Passenger-Vehicle-Occupant-Fatality Rates
1983–95 1990–95
Fatalities Fatalities per Fatalities Fatalities per
Age per 100,000 Billion Car per 100,000 Billion Car
Group People Miles of Travel People Miles of Travel
16–19 8.0 52.5 12.7 37.8
20–24 12.8 32.7 11.8 29.1
25 2.9 42.7 7.1 36.3
Table 3.2 Passenger-Vehicle-Occupant-Fatality Rates, 1983, 1990, and 1995
Annual Fatalities Fatalities
Age per Person per 100,000 per Billion
Group Car Miles of Travel People Car Miles of Travel
1983
16–19 5,861 32.06 54.22
20–24 9,773 31.21 31.62
25 7,972 14.00 17.40
1990
16–19 8,218 33.78 40.74
20–24 10,177 30.85 30.01
25 9,293 14.63 15.64
1995
16–19 11,498 29.48 25.43
20–24 12,656 27.20 21.29
25 13,503 13.59 9.97
Sources: Fatalities are taken from the FARS. Occupant miles are taken from the 1983, 1990,
and 1995 NPTS.
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teen fatalities from 1983 to 1995 and a 12.7 percent reduction over the pe-
riod 1990–95. Both these changes were substantially larger than the drop
in rates for adults aged twenty-ﬁve and older. In contrast, the drop in
rates is much more dramatic in both periods when one considers the large
increase in vehicle miles traveled by teens. Over the period 1983–95, fatal-
ity rates denominated by miles fell by over 50 percent for teens and 43
percent for adults. Over the period 1990–95, the drop in fatality rates de-
nominated by miles was similar for teensand older adults, in the 36–38 per-
cent range. Because of the large increase in miles of travel over the period,
the ratio of the teen miles-denominated fatality rate to the adult rate fell
to 2.5 by 1995.
The trends in teen traﬃc fatalities also exhibit a distinctive heterogeneity
with respect to gender, with most of the gains in traﬃc safety over this
period concentrated among males. In ﬁgure 3.5, we report the percentage
of car-occupant fatalities that are males by each age group. Notice that,
for all age groups, we observe a large drop in the fraction male over the
period 1982–97. For example, among teens, the fraction of fatalities that
are male falls 11 percent between 1982 and 1997, from about three-
quarters of all deaths to just over two-thirds. When we graph the male and
female car-occupant-fatality rates by sex for teens (see ﬁg. 3.6), we see that
the drop is driven by a much larger reduction in the male deathrate. Be-
tween 1982 and 1997, male teen deathrates fell by 32 percent, about twice
the rate for female teens.
There are a number of possible explanations for why teen car travel in-
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Fig. 3.5 Percentage of total motor-vehicle fatalities that are malecreased so dramatically between 1983 and 1995. However, we should ﬁrst
note that car travel increased for all other age groups as well, so the in-
crease among teens is part of a larger trend toward more car travel in
society. Nonetheless, we can begin considering the increases in teen driving
by ﬁrst identifying a determinant that does not appear to explain the
trends. There appears to have been no large change in the fraction of teens
working or in teen labor income over this period. Using data from the
1984 and 1996 March Current Population Survey (CPS), we calculated a
number of labor market variables for those aged seventeen to twenty. Since
the March CPS provides labor market data for the previous year, these
samples represent work for those aged sixteen to nineteen (roughly) in
1983 and 1995. Over these years, there was little change in teen work. The
fraction of teens with labor income in these years was 68.3 and 68.2 per-
cent, respectively. Likewise, real annual labor market earnings (in 1995
dollars) increased only slightly, from $3,910 in 1983 to $4,034 in 1995.
Part of the increase in car travel can potentially be explained by greater
vehicle ownership in households with teens. Using data from the NPTS,
we ﬁnd that mean vehicles per household in households with teens in-
creased from 2.28 in 1983 to 2.44 in 1995. More important, the fraction of
households with more than one car increased from 69 to 79 percent, and
the fraction with more than two cars increased from 42 to 48 percent. We
should stress that, although these ﬁgures suggest that teens may have more
opportunities to drive today, there is also the possibility that households
may have increased vehicle ownership in response to the higher travel de-
mands of other household members.
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Fig. 3.6 Total motor-vehicle-fatality rates, male and female teensSome have suggested to us that the increased labor force participation
of women may explain increased travel among teens. As women have en-
tered the job market, driving patterns have changed, greatly increasing the
number and composition of trips that women take (Spain 1997; McGuckin
and Murakami 1999). Having a working mother may also inﬂuence the
driving of teens, providing them with a greater need and/or more opportu-
nity to drive. Data from the 1995 NPTS support the hypothesis that teens
with working mothers drive more. From this survey, we constructed a
sample of teens from the person data ﬁle. This ﬁle contains a composite
measure of annual miles driven as well as detailed demographic informa-
tion about respondents and their families. For teens who report that they
are children of the household reference person, we merge into their obser-
vation an indicator that equals 1 when the mother works and 0 otherwise.
Regressing annual miles driven on controls for household income, family
size, age, race, ethnicity, sex, population size of the area where the house-
hold is located, and whether the mother works, we ﬁnd that teens who
have a working mother drive thirteen hundred miles more (t-statistic of
2.76) than other teens, which is about 20 percent of the sample mean of
miles driven. Although the diﬀerence in annual driving miles across the
two groups is large, the rise in labor force participation can explain only a
small fraction of the increase in car travel. Data from the March CPS
suggest that, among women aged thirty-ﬁve to sixty-ﬁve with school-age
children in the family, the fraction with labor income increased by 10 per-
centage points, from 77 to 87 percent, between 1983 and 1995. This change
in female labor force participation would explain only a 130-mile increase
in driving over this period.
Another possible explanation for increased teen driving is the large drop
in fuel prices over this period. Data from the Department of Energy indi-
cate that nominal prices for a gallon of unleaded regular gasoline were
$1.24 in 1983 and $1.15 in 1995.7 Deﬂating these numbers by the consumer
price index, the real price of a gallon of gasoline has fallen by almost 40
percent over this period. We suspect that the price elasticity of demand
for gasoline is larger in absolute value for teens than for adults for two
reasons. First, teens have lower incomes. More important, however, we sus-
pect that teen car travel is more discretionary, and there is some evidence
that discretionary car travel is more sensitive to price changes (Walls,
Krupnick, and Hood 1993; Berkowitz et al. 1990).
3.1.2 Why Have Teen Traﬃc Fatality Rates Fallen since the 1980s?
The evidence presented here indicates that there have been substantive
gains in teen traﬃc safety over the last two decades. When teen traﬃc
fatalities are denominated by vehicle miles traveled, fatality rates have
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7. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/energy.overview/monthly.energy/mer9-4.fallen by 50 percent since 1983, which exceeds the corresponding gain
among adults over this period (table 3.3 above). This important trend
could reﬂect two general inﬂuences: a reduction in the number of accidents
and an increase in the survivability of crashes. This latter determinant can
change for at least three reasons. First, the types of crashes may have
changed if, for example, there are fewer high-speed crashes today than
there were in previous years. Second, the crashworthiness of the automo-
biles driven by teens may have changed, enhancing the chances of crash
survival. Finally, crash survivability can be enhanced through better medi-
cal care and the use of important occupant-safety devices such as seat
belts and air bags. In this section, we present novel evidence suggesting
that each of these factors has to varying degrees contributed to the down-
ward trend in teen traﬃc fatalities.
Changing Crash Rates
Holding crash survivability constant, fatality rates should track the fre-
quency of crashes. While there is some evidence that crash rates have de-
clined, these changes may explain only part of the drop. More speciﬁcally,
using data on the frequency of accidents from the National Automotive
Sampling Survey (NASS), we ﬁnd that crash rates have changed only mod-
estly in recent years. The NASS is an annual sample of police accident
reports that is sponsored by the NHTSA. The initial survey year for the
NASS was 1988, so, unfortunately, we have a much smaller time series for
accident rates than for fatalities. By 1998, the NASS reported data on
about ﬁfty thousand of the more than 6 million police-reported accidents.
The structure of the NASS is similar to that of the FARS in that data are
reported at the person, accident, and vehicle level.
In ﬁgure 3.7, we report the time series of accident rates for passenger-
vehicle occupants by age groups for the period 1988–97. In this ﬁgure,
accidents are per one thousand people. As with fatalities, teen rates are
two to three times that of older adults. More important, accident rates
follow a similar pattern as fatalities; that is, there was a sharp drop be-
tween 1988 and 1992, with a small increase in accidents since then. These
results do suggest that some of the decline in fatalities can be attributed
to a change in the frequency of accidents. However, crash rates have not
fallen nearly as fast as fatalities. Between 1988 and 1992, for teens, fatality
rates fell by 23 percent, but crash rates fell by only 11 percent.
The crashes represented by ﬁgure 3.7 are of various levels of severity,
varying from simple “fender benders” to multivehicle accidents with fatali-
ties. We would prefer to examine the time-series pattern for accident rates
that are likely to produce injuries and fatalities. However, in this case,
we cannot deﬁne severity on the basis of occupant injuries since vehicle
crashworthiness may have changed over time. Instead, we can deﬁne acci-
dent rates on the basis of external damage to the vehicle. Speciﬁcally, we
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the vehicle had to be towed from the accident scene.8 In ﬁgure 3.8, we
report the occupant crash rates for occupants who were in vehicles that
were damaged enough to be towed away. The percentage drop in tow-away
rates in the period 1988–92 is nearly identical to the drop in all crashes.
Interestingly, however, there has been a large increase in tow-away crashes
since 1992, with only a small increase in fatalities. The fact that the drop
in accident and tow-away rates over the late 1980s and early 1990s is
smaller than the drop in fatalities suggests that a change in crash rates can
at best explain only part of the improvements in traﬃc safety. In the next
section, we present evidence that crash survivability has also been en-
hanced.
These results do, however, beg the question why accident and fatality
rates have fallen. Perhaps the most promising explanation involves the re-
lation between teen alcohol use and traﬃc safety.9 As is discussed in a
later section, the widely recognized links between teen traﬃc accidents
and alcohol use have motivated extensive policy making at the state and
federal levels designed both to limit teens’ access to alcohol and to deter
drunk driving. There is a variety of direct medical evidence indicating that
8. Technically, we include all towed vehicles in the accident rate, including those that were
towed for reasons other than drivability, such as the physical condition of the driver. These
represent a small fraction of towed vehicles.
9. Changes in the prevalence of drunk driving may also have inﬂuenced crash rates as
well as crash survivability through possible eﬀects on crash severity and responsiveness to
subsequent medical care.
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Fig. 3.7 Accident rates for passenger-car occupantsalcohol use signiﬁcantly impairs driver judgment as well as such critical
motor skills as tracking, steering, and emergency responsiveness even at
fairly low BACs (GAO 1999). Zador (1991) found, using FARS data, that
the risk of fatal-crash involvement was substantially increased at BACs in
the range of 0.05–0.09, particularly for young drivers.10 More recently,
Levitt and Porter (1999a) examined the fatality risk of drunk driving by
adopting a unique empirical approach, one based on comparing the alco-
hol involvement of drivers in single-vehicle and two-car crashes. Their esti-
mates suggest that drinking drivers are at least eight to nine times more
likely than sober drivers to cause fatal crashes.11
However, Levitt and Porter (1999a) also recognized that the FARS data
on BACs are not gathered for all participants in fatal crashes and that
police reports of alcohol involvement may be incomplete.12 Fortunately, we
can construct a plausible proxy for alcohol-involved teen traﬃc fatalities
by exploiting the distinct diurnal pattern in rates of alcohol involvement.
The available data clearly indicate that alcohol involvement in fatal crashes
is substantially higher at night. For example, using fatalities with identiﬁed
BAC levels for teens over the period 1982–92, we graph in ﬁgure 3.9 the
percentage of fatalities that have alcohol involvement by the time of day
10. In most states, it is “illegal per se” to drive with a BAC of 0.10 or more. Seventeen
states have now set this limit at 0.08. Several other developed nations have also adopted
regulations that make it illegal to drive with a BAC of 0.08 or lower.
11. Their estimates also point to the more limited fatality risk associated with young but
sober drivers, which suggests the inﬂuence of other kinds of risk taking and/or inexperience.
12. They evaluate the robustness of their ﬁndings in part by replicating their results with
data from states with high rates of BAC testing.
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Fig. 3.8 Tow-away-accident rates for passenger-car occupantswhen accidents happen. Notice that, for certain times of the day, alcohol-
related fatalities represent as much as 70 percent of all motor-vehicle
deaths. In contrast, between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., alcohol
is a cofactor in only about 15 percent of all crashes. Therefore, like other
literature in this area, we use nighttime motor-vehicle fatalities as a proxy
for the number of fatalities with alcohol involvement. Following the
NHTSA’s convention, we deﬁne nighttime traﬃc fatalities as those that oc-
cur between 6:00 p.m. and 5:59 a.m.
In ﬁgure 3.10, we present the nighttime motor-vehicle-fatality rate over
the period 1975–97 for the three age groups. Notice that the drop in these
alcohol-sensitive measures is fairly dramatic—between 1979 and 1997,
this teen alcohol-sensitive fatality rate fell by almost 50 percent. In ﬁgure
3.11, we report age-speciﬁc nighttime fatality rates for teens. These ﬁgures
suggest that the largest drop in fatality rates has been among eighteen- and
nineteen-year-olds. The drop in alcohol-related fatalities can be traced in
part to restricted access to alcohol and more aggressive drunk-driving leg-
islation. Most notably, in 1977, thirty states had a minimum legal drinking
age (MLDA) of eighteen. However, by the late 1980s, partly in response
to federal pressure, all states had raised their MLDA to twenty-one. These
legislative changes coincided with the large drop in fatalities during the
1980s (ﬁg. 3.11). In the next section, we take a closer look at the eﬀect that
these and other alcohol and drunk-driving policies have had on teen mo-
tor-vehicle-fatality rates.
The eﬀect that the drop in alcohol-related fatalities has had on aggregate
fatality rates can be seen by looking at the time-series graph for daytime
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Fig. 3.9 Percentage alcohol involvement of motor-vehicle fatalities by time of day,
FARS 1982–92, teens aged 15–19fatality rates, shown in ﬁgure 3.12. Between 1979 and 1997, a time period
when alcohol-related motor-vehicle fatalities are falling by 50 percent, day-
time fatalities have stayed roughly constant. Since nighttime fatalities ac-
count for roughly 72 percent of all fatalities in 1979, these fatalities have
fallen by 50 percent, and daytime fatalities have not fallen at all, it is not
surprising that total motor-vehicle fatalities have fallen by almost (72 per-
cent  50 percent ) 36 percent over this period.
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Fig. 3.10 Nighttime motor-vehicle-fatality rate
Fig. 3.11 Nighttime motor-vehicle-fatality rates for teensChanges in Crash Survivability
It looks as though the drop in alcohol-related accidents may explain a
large fraction of the long-run change in teen fatality rates. However, this
important class of changes does not tell the whole story. In particular, note
that alcohol-related fatalities, as measured by nighttime fatality rates, have
fallen steadily since 1986. In contrast, aggregate fatality rates (both total
and occupant, as measured in ﬁgs. 3.1 and 3.3 above) have been holding
steady since 1992. Part of the reversal in the aggregate trend can be traced
to an uptick in accidents. In ﬁgures 3.7 and 3.8 above, we saw that accident
and tow-away-accident rates have actually increased by 5 and 10 percent,
respectively, over the period 1992–97. However, part of the change in fatal-
ity rates may also have been driven by changes in crash survivability.
There have been four major trends that have altered the crashworthiness
of automobiles. Between 1975 and 1985, new cars became much more fuel
eﬃcient, primarily by shedding vehicle weight. Over this time period, the
curb weight of new cars sold fell by a thousand pounds (Kahane 1997). In
a reversal of this trend, as real gas prices have fallen, the big automobile
has returned, this time in the form of light trucks—pickups, sport-utility
vehicles, and minivans. Between 1985 and 1993, the population of such
light trucks increased by 50 percent (Kahane 1997). Today, light trucks
represent one-third of registered vehicles (Gabler and Hollowell 1998).
Light trucks are also 340 pounds heavier than the average new car. Larger
vehicles, especially light trucks, are also much more crashworthy than
lighter automobiles (Joksch, Massie, and Pichler 1998). In table 3.4, we
present data from the NASS that identiﬁes by age the fraction of occu-
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Fig. 3.12 Daytime motor-vehicle-fatality ratepants in accidents who were drivers or passengers in light trucks. This
fraction has doubled since 1988.
Another factor leading to improved survivability is enhanced trauma
care. Regional trauma centers were established nearly twenty years ago to
reduce injury-related mortality. By 1995, twenty-two states had regional
trauma systems (Nathans et al. 2000). Evaluations suggest that the pres-
ence of regional trauma centers has reduced mortality among crash vic-
tims. Mullins and Mann (1999) found a 15–20 percent improved survival
rate among the seriously injured treated at trauma centers. Nathans et al.
(2000) found that states with regional trauma centers had a 9 percent lower
automobile-accident-mortality rate than did states without such centers.
Quantifying the beneﬁts of these centers is not the focus of this paper, but
there is some evidence in the FARS that enhanced medical care has im-
proved the probability of survival among those who make it to a hospital.
Consider the following example. Let D represent whether a crash victim
dies and H represent whether he or she went to the hospital. We suspect
that improved medical care has enhanced survivability or reduced the con-
ditional probability prob(D|H). Because the FARS contains only those
involved in fatal accidents, we cannot estimate this probability directly.
However, we can use the data in FARS by recognizing that, by Bayes’s
theorem, prob(D|H)  prob(H|D)prob(D)/prob(H). Notice that the prob-
ability of survival if a victim makes it to the hospital is proportional to the
probability that we observed someone in a hospital given that he or she
died. The intuition is straightforward. Suppose that, of a hundred crash
victims, ﬁfty die at the scene, and the remaining victims are transported
to a hospital. If in-hospital-survival rates improve, then prob(H|D) must
fall. The 1980 FARS data indicate that 68 percent of fatalities were admit-
ted to a hospital. This number fell considerably over the next eighteen
years, dropping to 52 percent by 1997. These results are consistent with
the hypothesis of improved medical care.
Another important trend that has clearly altered crash survivability sub-
stantively is the increased prevalence of seat-belt use (e.g., table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Characteristics of Passenger-Vehicle Occupants in Accidents, NASS
Category/
Age Group 1988 1992 1997
% Belt Use among Occupants in Accidents
16–19 41.6 68.8 67.9
20–24 43.1 71.4 66.0
25 38.4 77.4 70.7
% of All Occupants in Accidents in Light Trucks/Minivans/SUVs
16–19 12.2 16.1 20.0
20–24 14.3 17.1 19.7
25 13.8 18.7 22.2
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tality risk of crashes.13 However, roadside and highway observations in the
United States during the 1970s and early 1980s suggested that belt-use
rates were only about 14 percent. Surprisingly, this rate had been relatively
constant across prior years (Evans 1991). However, more recent observa-
tions suggest that belt use has risen nearly ﬁvefold to 70 percent (NHTSA
1999a). As a later section demonstrates, a substantial proportion of these
gains is directly due to the state-level adoption of mandatory seat-belt
laws. At the beginning of 1984, no state required the use of a seat belt.
However, since then, every state except New Hampshire has adopted some
form of mandatory belt-use law (NHTSA 1999b). These laws were pro-
moted in part by a federal regulation that would have delayed introduction
of a proposed passive-restraint standard if two-thirds of the country were
covered by mandatory belt-use laws. Since much of the surveillance data
on belt use is based on direct roadside and highway observation, it is im-
plausible to rely on that data to establish trends in youth-speciﬁc belt use.
However, survey data do allow us to consider the age-speciﬁc trends in belt
use. While any survey data are qualiﬁed by the potential biases inherent in
self-reported health behaviors, they appear to track observed belt use as
well as policy responses (Dee 1998).
The longest time series of belt use available is from the CDC’s Behav-
ioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). The BRFSS is an annual
telephone-based survey designed to generate representative state-level
data on the prevalence of important health behaviors among those aged
eighteen or older (CDC 1998). The BRFSS began in 1984 by ﬁelding sur-
veys in ﬁfteen states. By 1993, respondents in all ﬁfty states were ques-
tioned. In ﬁgure 3.13, we plot the yearly belt-use rates for our three age
groups. Belt use is deﬁned as the percentage of BRFSS respondents who
report always wearing a seat belt. In all years, teens have lower rates of
belt use than do older drivers. However, all three age groups have dramatic
increases in self-reported belt-use rates over this period. Use rates among
teens increased by a factor of almost four, going from only 15 percent in
1984 to just under 57 percent in 1995. The percentage point increase in
use was larger for adults, going from 23 to 68 percentage points, but this
was only a threefold increase in use.
Unfortunately, the BRFSS surveys only adults eighteen and older. To
obtain some evidence on belt use in a slightly younger population, we ex-
amine data from the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS),
which is introduced in the next section. The YRBSS surveyed high school
students in 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1997. Restricting our attention to the
13. Evidence on the technological eﬃcacy of seat belts, the eﬀects of mandatory seat-belt
laws, and the possibility of compensating risk taking by drivers is discussed in detail in a
later section.
140 Thomas S. Dee and William N. Evansdriving-age population, we calculated belt-use rates (deﬁned as the frac-
tion who always wear a seat belt) for three age groups (sixteen, seventeen,
and eighteen and older) for the four years of the survey. The use rates for
sixteen-year-olds in the four survey years are 29.0, 31.9, 31.5, and 34.0
percent, respectively. The numbers for seventeen-year-olds (28.6, 34.8,
34.6, and 37.1 percent, respectively) and the eighteen and older group
(27.2, 31.2, 35.2, and 34.5 percent, respectively) are similar to those for
sixteen-year-olds. These data suggest that belt use is less common among
these younger teens. However, during the 1990s, their belt use has been
trending upward.
Another trend that is also likely to have improved crash survivability
over this period is the increased installations of air bags. In 1984, the
NHTSA required that automatic occupant-protection systems, such as air
bags or automatic belts, be phased into passenger cars during 1987–90.
All vehicles manufactured after 1 September 1993 were required to have
automatic protection for the driver and right-front passenger. The Inter-
modal Surface Transportation Eﬃciency Act (ISTEA), passed by Con-
gress in 1991, required all passenger cars manufactured after 1 September
1997 and light trucks manufactured after 1 September 1998 to have driver
and passenger air bags plus manual lap-shoulder belts. However, since belt
use has increased so sharply over this period and belts are substantially
more eﬀective at reducing fatality risk, it is unlikely that the adoption of
air bags is as empirically relevant. Levitt and Porter (1999b) ﬁnd that con-
ventional estimates have overstated the eﬃcacy of air bags. They estimate
that air bags reduce fatality risk by between 9 percent (partial frontal colli-
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Fig. 3.13 Seat-belt use (all the time), BRFSSsions) and 16 percent (direct frontal collisions) but that seat belts reduce
fatality risk by 60 percent. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety es-
timates that roughly 46 percent of cars and light trucks on the road today
have driver-side air bags and that one-third of these cars have passenger-
side air bags.14
3.2 Who Are the Risky Teen Drivers?
The numbers given in table 3.1 above illustrate that the vast majority of
teen motor-vehicle fatalities occur among males. Are there other observed
characteristics that would allow one to predict who will be the risk takers?
To address this question, we evaluated data from the national school-based
YRBSS. The YRBSS is a nationally representative survey of roughly six-
teen thousand high school students from 150 schools. The survey is spon-
soredbytheCDCandhasbeenﬁeldedeverytwoyearssince1991.Thepur-
poseofthesurveyistotrackpriorityhealth-riskbehaviorsofhighschoolers
over time. In our work, we present estimates from the 1997 YRBSS.15
From the YRBSS, we can construct three variables that indicate teen
risk taking in the car. The ﬁrst variable equals 1 for those who report
always wearing a seat belt, the second equals 1 for those who drove after
drinking in the past thirty days, and the third equals 1 for those who rode
in a car in the past thirty days with a driver who had been drinking. With
these variables, we estimate a simple probit that predicts a response of yes
to these questions. For our analysis, we use data for sixteen- to eighteen-
year-olds, deleting data for ﬁfteen-year-olds since most cannot drive. Al-
though the YRBSS contains detailed data on risky behavior, the data set
has limited information on individual characteristics. We can include as
covariates information on age, race, sex, parents’ education, and urbani-
city. Given the variation across states in traﬃc-safety laws, we also include
in each model a full set of state dummy variables.
The results of these simple probits are included in table 3.5. The sample
means for each outcome are reported in the ﬁnal row of the table. We
report the marginal eﬀects, which represent the change in the probability
of the event happening given a change in the covariate. So, for example,
females are 10.3 percentage points more likely to wear a safety belt, which
represents about a 35 percent higher use rate relative to the mean. Females
are also much less likely to drive after drinking or to ride in a car with a
drinking driver. Blacks and Hispanics are both less likely to wear seat belts
but also less likely to be associated with drunk driving. The only strong
eﬀects of age are that younger drivers are less likely to drive drunk but
also slightly less likely to wear a seat belt. Parents’ education is a strong
14. See http://www.highwaysafety.org/safety_facts/airbags.htm.
15. Results from the three other YRBSS data sets were similar.
142 Thomas S. Dee and William N. Evanspredictor of belt use, with use monotonically increasing with parents’ edu-
cation. Interestingly, there is little correlation with parents’ education and
the two drinking-and-driving variables. Suburban and urban respondents
look similar, and both are much more likely than rural residents to wear
seat belts and not drink and drive.
One important characteristic that is strongly associated with teens’ risk
taking behind the wheel is their actions concerning other risky behaviors.
Teens’ decisions not to wear a seat belt or drive drunk appear to follow a
pattern of risk taking along many dimensions—teens who take risks in the
car appear to take risks in other aspects of life as well. In the ﬁrst column
of table 3.6, we report a number of questions from the 1997 YRBSS that
measure, with a discrete yes-or-no variable, students’ responses to ques-
Table 3.5 Probit Estimates of Traﬃc-Safety-Choice Models, 1997 YRBSS,
16–18-Year-Olds, Probit Marginal Eﬀects
Traﬃc-Safety Choice (1  yes, 0  no)
Always Drove after Rode in Car
Wear Drinking Driven by Someone
Seat in Past Under the Inﬂuence
Covariate Belt? 30 Days? in Past 30 Days?
Female .103 .113 .078
(.010) (.008) (.010)
Black .174 .119 .045
(.018) (.016) (.017)
Hispanic .058 .028 .027
(.019) (.016) (.018)
Other race .113 .059 .033
(.014) (.012) (.014)
Age 16 .038 .104 .043
(.013) (.011) (.013)
Age 17 .006 .000 .031
(.013) (.010) (.012)
Parents’ education not reported .092 .049 .036
(.024) (.021) (.023)
Highest parents’ education is high .193 .028 .032
school dropout (.022) (.017) (.020)
Highest parents’ education is high .100 .005 .00
school graduate (.015) (.012) (.014)
Highest parents’ education is some .043 .030 .018
college (.012) (.011) (.012)
Live in urban area .109 .135 .121
(.021) (.017) (.020)
Live in suburban area .123 .111 .127
(.021) (.016) (.020)
Mean of dependent variable .352 .206 .385
Note: All models include state ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.tions about a number of activities that pose health risks. For each health
habit, we report the number of valid observations and the sample mean.
We next report the diﬀerence in means for the particular health habit on
the basis of whether a respondent reports always wearing a seat belt or
riding in or driving a car after drinking. These numbers are reported for
males and females. So, in the ﬁrst row, 37.8 percent of males report smok-
ing in the past thirty days. This smoking rate is 22.7 percentage points
lower for those who always wear a seat belt, 35 percentage points higher
among those who rode with a drinking driver, and 43 percentage points
higher for those who drove after drinking. For males, knowing whether
you are a risky driver indicates that you have twice the average chance
of smoking!
The results in the rest of the table are striking. Risky drivers (those not
wearing seat belts and those riding/driving after drinking) are less likely
to wear a bicycle helmet, more likely to have been drinking in the past
thirty days, more likely to have been in a ﬁght in the past year, more likely
to smoke marijuana, more likely to have had unprotected sex, more likely
to have had fatty foods like burgers and fries, less likely to eat fruits and
vegetables, and less likely to exercise! The diﬀerences in means are in most
cases slightly smaller for females, but, for some of the variables (e.g., smok-
ing), the estimates are comparable.
3.3 Which Policies Have Improved Teen Traﬃc Safety?
The evidence presented in the previous sections of this paper has under-
scored the dramatic level of lethal risk faced by teens in cars as well as
important stylized facts about the character of these risks. However, this
evidence also indicated that, over the past twenty years, there have been
impressive gains in teen traﬃc safety, both in absolute terms and relative
to adult traﬃc-related risks. This evidence also suggested that these gains
have been driven both by a reduction in the number of accidents and by
increases in the probability of surviving a crash. However, these striking
conclusions beg further questions about what factors might constitute the
root causes of these impressive improvements. The extensive literature on
traﬃc safety has attributed much of these gains to the broad and aggres-
sive new regulation over this period of key behaviors related to traﬃc
safety. This section presents a critical overview of this evidence. First, we
discuss the theoretical and empirical evidence linking the adoption and
enforcement of mandatory seat-belt laws to the observed improvements in
the prevalence of belt use among teens (ﬁg. 3.13 above). Then we discuss
the more general evidence on the eﬃcacy of key traﬃc-safety regulations,
in part, by presenting reduced-form evaluations of how state-level policies
have inﬂuenced the number of teen traﬃc fatalities. This discussion fo-
cuses, in particular, on four classes of state-level policies: policies that in-
Teens and Traﬃc Safety 145ﬂuence youth access to alcohol, policies directed at the speciﬁc and gen-
eral deterrence of drunk driving,16 mandatory seat-belt laws, and highway
speed limits.
3.3.1 Seat-Belt Use
Evidence from both technological evaluations and actual crashes sug-
gests that seat belts are highly eﬀective at reducing the fatality risk asso-
ciated with a crash. Early estimates indicated that this risk reduction
was roughly 50 percent (Evans 1986; NHTSA 1984). However, in a recent
study, Levitt and Porter (1999b) conclude that such estimates may be bi-
ased downward because of sample selectivity and that the actual risk re-
duction associated with seat-belt use is 60 percent. Regardless, it was in
part a growing awareness of such dramatic lifesaving beneﬁts that moti-
vated the widespread adoption of state laws mandating their use. Begin-
ning with New York in late 1984, every state but New Hampshire has
adopted a mandatory seat-belt law.17 However, these laws were accompa-
nied by diﬀering levels of enforcement. More speciﬁcally, most states (cur-
rently thirty-eight) adopted “secondary” enforcement, which allows only
a citation for a seat-belt violation if the driver has been stopped for another
infraction. In the eleven states with “primary” enforcement, a seat-belt
violation alone is suﬃc i e n tc a u s ef o rac i t a t i o n .
The technological eﬃcacy of seat belts suggests that the widespread
adoption of mandatory seat-belt laws may have generated substantive
gains in traﬃc safety. However, there are at least two reasons to suspect
that these gains may have been sharply attenuated. One is the possibility
of “selective recruitment”—a smaller response in belt use among those
most likely to be involved in accidents (young drivers, males, those who
drink). A second reason is the possibility of risk-compensating behavior.
Peltzman (1975) argued that the lifesaving beneﬁts of such safety require-
ments as seat-belt laws may be reduced if drivers subsequently increase
their risk taking behind the wheel. A casual reading of the U.S. experience
with seat-belt laws suggests that this may actually have occurred. More
speciﬁcally, naive evaluations that compare belt-use rates before and after
a seat-belt law suggest that such laws increased use by roughly 28 percent-
age points (Campbell and Campbell 1988). If seat belts reduce fatality
risks by 50 percent, this increase in belt use should be accompanied by
ad e c r e a s ei nt r a ﬃc fatalities of roughly 14 percent in the absence of a
compensating behavioral response. However, most studies suggest that fa-
talities fell by only about 8 percent (Evans and Graham 1991). Nonethe-
less, Dee (1998) argues that the U.S. experience with seat-belt laws did not
16. General deterrence is an attempt to reduce drunk driving in the general population.
Speciﬁc deterrence is an attempt to punish known oﬀenders so that they do not oﬀend again.
17. Two states (Massachusetts and Nebraska) adopted, rescinded, and later reinstated
such laws.
146 Thomas S. Dee and William N. Evansinduce a dramatic increase in risk taking by drivers.18 The ﬂaw in the prior
reasoning is that it does not seem that seat-belt laws actually increased
belt use by 28 percentage points. Such estimates (which are typically based
on interrupted time-series analysis) appear to confound the long-term
trend toward increased belt use with the adoption of the state laws, over-
stating those laws’ eﬀects dramatically. Dee (1998) concludes that manda-
tory seat-belt laws increased belt use by only about 18 percent—a magni-
tude consistent with the observed reduction in fatalities and a number that
suggests that compensating risk taking is of minor importance. However,
Dee (1998) does ﬁnd evidence of selective recruitment: a smaller response
in belt use among the young and, in particular, young male drivers.
Table 3.7 summarizes this evidence by presenting estimates of how man-
18. Evans and Graham (1991) also present evidence consistent with this claim: the adop-
tion of mandatory seat-belt laws was not associated with increases in pedestrian or cyclist
deaths related to traﬃc accidents.
Table 3.7 OLS and Probit Estimates of Impact of Mandatory Seat-Belt Laws on
Seat-Belt Use
OLS Coeﬃcient or Probit Marginal Eﬀect
Model (2)
Model (1): Mandatory Mandatory
Mean Mandatory Seat-Belt Law, Seat-Belt Law,
Data Set Sample Belt Seat-Belt Primary Secondary
and Sample Size Usage Law Enforcement Enforcement
NHTSA 19 City 126 .422 .172 .351 .158
Survey (1985–91) (.019) (.043) (.018)
1984–93 BRFSS:
All respondents 577,422 .541 .183 .260 .172
(.003) (.006) (.003)
Balanced panel of 239,779 .504 .144 .212 .141
15 states (.004) (.011) (.004)
25 513,557 .549 .190 .247 .179
(.003) (.006) (.003)
20–24 47,244 .488 .137 .233 .126
(.010) (.023) (.010)
18–19 16,621 .438 .147 .249 .136
(.017) (.040) (.019)
18–19 males 7,953 .383 .105 .209 .091
(.024) (.058) (.027)
18–19 females 8,668 .489 .188 .286 .176
(.024) (.053) (.026)
Note: All models include year and state or city ﬁxed eﬀects. The BRFSS models also include covariates
for gender, race/ethnicity, age, and age squared. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. For further
details, see Dee (1998).
Teens and Traﬃc Safety 147datory seat-belt laws and their enforcement levels inﬂuenced belt use. This
evidence draws on two distinct data sources. The ﬁrst source is pooled city-
level data from the 1985–91 19 City Surveys, which employed observation
techniques to gather information (e.g., NHTSA 1989). While these aggre-
gate data do not allow us to address the selective-recruitment hypothesis
by focusing on heterogeneous responses in particular subgroups, they do
have the virtue of being observed as opposed to self-reported. Pooling
seven years of data over eighteen cities leaves a data set with 126 obser-
vations.19 With this data set, we estimate a simple analysis-of-covariance
model in which we regress the fraction belt use on a series of city and year
ﬁxed eﬀects and the belt-use intervention dummy variables, which equal 1
in years when the laws were in eﬀect and 0 otherwise. These estimates,
reported in the ﬁrst row of table 3.7, suggest that mandatory seat-belt laws
increased use by about 17 percentage points and that these eﬀects were
plausibly heterogeneous with regard to enforcement levels.20 The impor-
tance of mandatory belt-use laws in explaining increased use rates is also
illustrated by the experience in Massachusetts. A secondary-enforcement
belt-use law went into eﬀect in Massachusetts on 1 January 1986, but the
law was repealed in a statewide referendum just eleven months later. Ob-
servation studies found that belt use increased from 20 percent before the
l a ww e n ti n t oe ﬀect to 37 percent after. However, belt use quickly fell back
down to 25 percent after the law was repealed (Hingson et al. 1988).
To examine the eﬀect of belt-use laws on teen use of seat belts, we must
move away from the observational data and utilize individual self-reports
of belt use. For this exercise, we use the BRFSS data introduced above.
We pool the BRFSS data over the period 1984–93, constructing a sample
of 577,422 respondents (Dee 1998). Belt use was deﬁned by a binary indi-
cator equal to 1 for respondents who claimed to use a seat belt “always.”
For this sample, we estimate simple linear-probability models, controlling
for basic demographic characteristics, state and year eﬀects, plus the belt-
use intervention indicator variables. The remaining results in table 3.7
present estimates of how mandatory seat-belt laws inﬂuenced this belt-use
measure for all respondents as well as for speciﬁc age and gender groups.
Overall, evaluations based on the BRFSS data are similar to those based
on observation data. Mandatory seat-belt laws increased belt use by
roughly 18 percentage points with a plausible heterogeneity with respect
to the level of enforcement. As we noted above, the BRFSS contained data
19. The eighteen cities are Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, Boston, Chicago, Dallas,
Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis/St. Paul, New Orleans, New York, Phoenix,
Pittsburgh, Providence, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle. Data from Fargo/Moorhead
were excluded since this area crossed state lines.
20. However, since Houston and Dallas are the only represented cities with primary en-
forcement over this period, these results may not be fully generalizable to the experiences
across the country (Dee 1998).
148 Thomas S. Dee and William N. Evansfrom only ﬁfteen states in 1984 and expanded to include data for ﬁfty states
by 1993. We examined whether this change in sample composition is inﬂu-
encing our basic results. Evaluations based only on data from the ﬁfteen
statessurveyedinalltenyearsreturnsimilarresults.Theevidencefromeval-
uations based on subsets of the BRFSS respondents points to the existence
of some selective recruitment. Younger respondents and young males in
particular were less likely to increase their belt use in response to manda-
tory seat-belt laws and their enforcement levels sharply inﬂuenced belt use
among teens and may, therefore, have been an important source of recent
improvements in teen traﬃc safety. The reduced-form models presented in
the next section provide more direct evidence on this question by evaluat-
ing the inﬂuence of these regulations on the number of traﬃc fatalities.
3.3.2 Traﬃc Fatalities
This section discusses the reduced-form evidence linking a variety of
state policies to reductions in teen traﬃc fatalities.
Prior Literature
One widely recognized determinant of the recent reductions in teen
traﬃc fatalities is the nationwide movement calling for an MLDA of
twenty-one. In the late 1960s and 1970s, many states had lowered their
MLDA in response to a general sentiment toward the enfranchisement of
young adults as well as considerable doubt about the eﬃcacy of prohibiting
alcohol. By 1977, thirty states had an MLDA of only eighteen. However,
there was a growing realization that relaxed access to alcohol may have
increased the number of teen traﬃc fatalities. Partly in response to this
realization as well as strong ﬁnancial pressure by the federal government,
all states increased their MLDA to twenty-one by the late 1980s. Several
studies have established a clear link between the state-speciﬁc timing of
movements to higher MLDAs and reductions in traﬃc fatalities (e.g.,
Cook and Tauchen 1984; Evans et al. 1991; Chaloupka et al. 1993; Ruhm
1996; Dee 1999). Similarly, some studies have also concluded that there
are traﬃc-safety beneﬁts of another regulation that can limit access to al-
cohol: excise taxes on beer (Chaloupka et al. 1993; Evans et al. 1991; Ruhm
1996). However, recent evidence, which is discussed in more detail here,
has suggested that these links may be spurious (Dee 1999; Mast et al.
1999).
Another important set of policies that may have inﬂuenced the distinc-
tive recent trends in youth traﬃc fatalities is those aimed at the deterrence
of drunk driving. Policies designed to reduce drunk driving have prolifer-
ated over the last twenty years in response to increased public awareness
and indignation. One important type of state-level drunk-driving law was
the kind that made it “illegal per se” to drive with a speciﬁc BAC. All
states except Massachusetts and South Carolina currently have such an
Teens and Traﬃc Safety 149explicit limit. Most states initially established their BAC limit at 0.10 or
more. However, an increasing number of states (now nineteen) have estab-
lished a stricter deﬁnition at a BAC of 0.08. Federal eﬀorts to compel all
states to adopt 0.08 BAC laws have foundered recently, in part because of
controversies over the eﬃcacy of such laws at the state level (GAO 1999;
Dee, in press). Another major drunk-driving policy that has sometimes
been adopted simultaneously with an explicit BAC level is a regulation
allowing “administrative license revocations.” This policy, which has been
adopted in forty-one states, allows state licensing agencies to suspend or
revoke the driver’s license of an allegedly drunk driver prior to any court
action.21 All states have now also adopted “zero-tolerance” laws that make
it illegal per se for underage drivers to have a positive BAC regardless of
its value. Other drunk-driving policies include “dram-shop” statutes (or
case law) that allow injured parties to sue the servers of alcohol and regula-
tions that mandate jail time for ﬁrst-time DUI oﬀenders. Recent reviews
of the eﬃcacy of such drunk-driving policies (e.g., DeJong and Hingson
1998; Hingson 1996; Zador et al. 1989) uniformly conclude that all these
policies have been highly eﬀective. However, this evidence should be inter-
preted with some caution since the research methodologies vary widely
across studies. Ruhm (1996) addresses the eﬃcacy of several drunk-driving
and alcohol-related policies and ﬁnds that inferences regarding their
eﬀects can be sensitive to the omission of state and year ﬁxed eﬀects that
purge the unobserved and potentially confounding determinants that vary
across states and over time. However, Ruhm (1996) does ﬁnd that adminis-
trative license revocations were somewhat eﬀective in reducing traﬃc fatal-
ities among youths. This evidence is developed further here by examining
evidence on the hypothesized interactive eﬀects of administrative license
revocations and other policies that establish speciﬁc BAC limits at which
it is illegal to drive.
A third set of policies evaluated in this context is the mandatory seat-
belt laws discussed earlier. Given the evidence that these laws substantially
increased belt use among young drivers, we would expect to ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant fatality reductions in the absence of a compensatory increase in risk
taking. Since the available evidence suggests that the enforcement level
of these laws is relevant, those distinctions are allowed. The fourth set of
policies evaluated here reﬂects the changes in each state’s maximum speed
limit. In response to the Arab oil embargo, a national maximum speed
limit (NMSL) of ﬁfty-ﬁve miles per hour (MPH) was established in the
early 1970s. In 1987, these regulations were relaxed, and states were al-
lowed to raise their speed limits to sixty-ﬁve MPH on portions of the rural
interstate system (and in that year alone, thirty-eight states did so). In
21. The constitutionality of these regulations has been unsuccessfully challenged in sev-
eral states.
150 Thomas S. Dee and William N. Evans1995, the federal regulation of speed limits was eliminated, and most states
raised their maximum speed limit above sixty-ﬁve MPH.22 The prior em-
pirical evidence on the eﬀects of higher speed limits is mixed. Lave and
Elias (1994) suggest that the movement in the late 1980s to sixty-ﬁve-MPH
speed limits actually reduced overall fatalities by redirecting traﬃca w a y
from more dangerous secondary roads and inﬂuencing patterns of police
enforcement. However, this conclusion has been challenged in recent stud-
ies (e.g., Farmer et al. 1999) that also considered the eﬀects of more recent
movements to speed limits above sixty-ﬁve MPH. The evaluations pre-
sented here provide further evidence on this question.
In ﬁgure 3.14, we report the time-series of the percentage of the popula-
tion covered by four traﬃc-safety policies: mandatory belt-use laws, an
MLDA of twenty-one, the beer tax, and a speed limit of sixty-ﬁve. Notice
the steep increase in the fraction covered by belt use since 1984 and the
sharp drop in those covered by an MLDA of eighteen. The beer tax is
drifting downward until a federal tax hike in 1991; then it drifts downward
slowly again. The time-series pattern for this variable is determined mainly
by the changes in the price index. Over this period, few states are changing
their nominal excise tax on beer, and inﬂation is eroding its real value
over time.
In ﬁgure 3.15, we report for a shorter period the percentage of people
covered by laws aimed at the speciﬁc and the general deterrence of drunk
driving. Notice that, over this short period, coverage rates for most laws
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Fig. 3.14 Key state traﬃc-safety policies by year
22. During the day in portions of Montana, there is no posted speed limit for cars.are increasing dramatically. The lone exception is the BAC 0.10 laws,
which are declining somewhat as states shift to an “illegal per se” BAC
limit of 0.08. In both ﬁgure 3.14 and ﬁgure 3.15, there are a signiﬁcant
number of laws that are coming into eﬀect during our period of analysis.
Subsequently, in any model that analyzes the within-state changes in fatal-
ity rates over time, we should be able to detect whether these programs
reduced fatalities.
The models presented here also include controls for state-speciﬁc mac-
roeconomic trends (unemployment rate, real state personal income per
capita). Prior evidence (e.g., Evans and Graham 1988) has indicated that
traﬃc fatalities are procyclic, possibly reﬂecting the increased risk associ-
ated with road congestion as well as the associated variation in patterns of
alcohol use and drunk driving. To control for changes in safety that are
common to all states (e.g., the crashworthiness of cars, declining drinking
and driving owing to nonlegislative factors), we also include in all models
a set of year eﬀects.
Certain state policies that are omitted from these evaluations also de-
serve special mention. For example, several states require driver education
as a condition for getting a license. Unfortunately, the available evidence
(NHTSA 1994) suggests that these programs are not eﬀective. However, a
number of recent studies have emphasized the possible traﬃc-safety bene-
ﬁts of “graduated-licensing” systems for beginning drivers.23 Such regula-
23. Foss and Evenson (1999) review the evaluation results from graduated-licensing sys-
tems in New Zealand and related studies on curfew restrictions and conclude that graduated
licensing is likely to be successful.
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Fig. 3.15 Key alcohol-control policies by yeartions require that new drivers acquire experience in low-risk settings before
moving on to more complex driving environments. These systems vary in
their details (e.g., supervision requirements, driving curfews) but generally
consist of three distinct stages: a learning period, during which direct su-
pervision is required; an intermediate period, which may allow for unsu-
pervised driving in low-risk situations; and full licensure (IIHS 1999). In
recent years, these regulations have been widely adopted in the United
States. More speciﬁcally, since July 1996, twenty-four states have imple-
mented some form of graduated licensing (IIHS 1999). Unfortunately,
these experiences are too recent to evaluate with the currently available
FARS data.
However, age-speciﬁc regulations like driver licensing and MLDAs raise
more profound questions about their overall eﬃcacy that have not been
extensively explored in the current literature. Alcohol use and driving
(while either drunk or sober) are both activities where experiential learning
is likely to be important. The relevance of learning by doing to such ac-
tivities raises the possibility that the lifetime eﬃcacy of MLDAs and
licensing-age policies may be attenuated. More speciﬁcally, policies that
keep young adults away from alcohol and car travel may to some degree
simply shift the attendant mortality risks to an older age, where learning
by doing occurs. Both Males (1986) and Asch and Levy (1987) present
some evidence in support of this view with regard to the MLDA. These
studies can be criticized on methodological grounds.24 Nonetheless, this
issue suggests an important direction for future research on MLDAs and
driver-licensing policies.
Data and Speciﬁcations
The evaluations presented here are based on state-level counts of teen
traﬃc fatalities over the period 1977–97 that were drawn from FARS. In
order to evaluate response heterogeneity as well as inform the plausibility
of these inferences, ten distinct measures of teen traﬃc fatalities are em-
ployed. These ten measures are based on ﬁve diﬀerent fatality types de-
ﬁned over two age groups: sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds and eighteen-
to nineteen-year-olds. The ﬁve diﬀerent fatality types are passenger-vehicle
fatalities, total fatalities from nighttime accidents (6:00 p.m. to 5:59 a.m.),
total fatalities from daytime accidents (6:00 a.m. to 5:59 p.m.), and total
fatalities by gender. The unweighted state-year means for these counts are
reported in table 3.8. The daytime measure is particularly useful in this
context since it provides the basis for a compelling counterfactual that
evaluates the reliability of conventional inferences regarding policies re-
lated to alcohol and drunk driving. More speciﬁcally, as stated earlier,
alcohol involvement in fatal accidents is substantially higher at nighttime
24. For example, the Asch and Levy (1987) study is based on a single cross section of
state-level data.
Teens and Traﬃc Safety 153than during the day. Given this important stylized fact, we would expect
the estimated eﬀects of alcohol and drunk-driving policies to be sharply
attenuated, if not nonexistent, in models for daytime counts. However, if
such policies generate relatively large eﬀects in daytime models, we could
conclude that the model is generating specious inferences.25
Most reduced-form econometric speciﬁcations for panel data on traﬃc
fatalities model the fatality rate denominated by population size or number
of miles traveled. However, the evaluations presented here are based on an
alternative approach. Speciﬁcally, since the fatality counts examined here
are constructed relatively ﬁnely by age and other observed characteristics,
employing a conventional fatality rate could substantially reduce the sig-
nal-to-noise ratio. Table 3.8 presents some limited information on the dis-
tribution of fatality counts that illustrates the nature of this concern. A
substantial fraction of the state-year observations have fewer than ten or
twenty-ﬁve fatalities in a year. This problem is particularly acute for mod-
eling traﬃc fatalities among females as well as those that occur during the
day. Because of this concern, the evaluation results presented here are
based on count-data models that explicitly recognize that all the depen-
dent variables are nonnegative integers. Within this framework, the natural
log of the relevant population is treated instead as an additional regressor.
However, since the prior literature has emphasized the need to control
for unobserved state-speciﬁc eﬀects, conventional count-data techniques
cannot be employed. More speciﬁcally, conventional count-data models
do not generate consistent estimates when cross-sectional ﬁxed eﬀects are
introduced because of the “incidental-parameter” problem. Therefore, we
adopt the conditional-maximum-likelihood approach for negative bino-
mial models, which was developed Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984)
to study the development of patents in a panel of ﬁrms.26 The estimates
25. The power of this ad hoc counterfactual to identify speciﬁcation error should not be
overdrawn. We may ﬁnd plausible results in daytime models despite the presence of speciﬁ-
cation error. And, even when this approach clearly suggests speciﬁcation error, it provides at
best limited guidance as to its nature.
26. The negative binomial model is less restrictive than a Poisson regression since it accom-
modates the presence of overdispersion in the counts.
Table 3.8 State-Level Panel Data on Teen Traﬃc-Fatality Counts, 1977–97 FARS
% Obs. 
 10 % Obs. 
 25
Mean Fatalities Fatalities
Fatality Type 16–17 18–19 16–17 18–19 16–17 18–19
Passenger vehicles 46.3 64.0 15.5 9.1 34.9 27.1
Nighttime 29.2 44.1 24.9 16.5 55.9 39.1
Daytime 16.8 19.4 41.2 34.6 77.9 76.3
Male 31.1 47.4 23.8 15.0 54.1 36.5
Female 15.2 16.5 45.1 41.0 84.1 82.3
154 Thomas S. Dee and William N. Evansgenerated by these models can be interpreted as the proportionate change
in the given fatality count.
Results
The ﬁrst set of results reported in table 3.9 presents evidence on how
mandatory seat-belt laws, MLDAs, a sixty-ﬁve-MPH speed limit, and the
macroeconomic variables inﬂuence passenger-vehicle fatalities. In this
table, we report estimates for all fatalities by age and sex groupings. These
models are based only on data from the period 1977–92. The sample is
truncated in this fashion since nearly all the within-state variation in two
key policies (mandatory seat-belt laws and the MLDA) had ended by the
early 1990s.
In table 3.9, the estimated coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst row suggest that a seat-
belt law with primary enforcement signiﬁcantly reduced passenger-vehicle
fatalities among sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds by nearly 8 percent and
among eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds by almost 10 percent. In general,
these eﬀects are smaller in states that had only secondary enforcement for
their seat-belt laws and substantially larger among female teens. These
estimates are consistent with associated increases in belt use (table 3.7
above) and the technological eﬃcacy of seat belts and suggest that risk-
compensating behavior has not dramatically attenuated the lifesaving ben-
eﬁts of these laws. The coeﬃcients on the MLDA variables suggest that a
lower MLDA (i.e., easier access to alcohol) was associated with signiﬁ-
cantly higher counts of traﬃc fatalities among eighteen- to nineteen-year-
olds. Males aged eighteen to nineteen are more aﬀected by the MLDA
than are females, which is to be expected given the higher alcohol use
among males. These large and statistically signiﬁcant increases were in
most cases plausibly concentrated among nighttime as opposed to daytime
fatalities and, interestingly, were also concentrated among male teens. In
contrast, the evidence linking the MLDA variation to traﬃc fatalities
among sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds is at best limited.27 Other results in
table 3.9 indicate that the initial movement to sixty-ﬁve-MPH speed limits
did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence teen traﬃc fatalities but that these outcomes
do consistently vary inversely with the state unemployment rate.
To provide some estimate of how much of the secular decline in per
capita mortality rates can be attributed to these law changes, we conducted
a simple simulation. To avoid the incidental-parameters problem, we esti-
mated a conditional maximum-likelihood model in which we conditioned
on the total number of deaths in a state over a ﬁxed period of time. Be-
cause in our simulation we will want to examine how total fatalities change
when regulations are changed, this econometric model does not lend itself
well to these types of simulations. Therefore, we reestimated the basic
27. Cook and Tauchen (1984) reported similarly imprecise links between MLDA exposure
and traﬃc fatalities among sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.models from table 3.9 with a negative binomial maximum-likelihood
model, inserting a complete set of dummies. The coeﬃcients on the regula-
tion dummy variables were nearly identical to the results from conditional
maximum-likelihood estimations. We use this second set of negative bino-
mial estimates in the simulations. Using these parameter values, we can
estimate, for each state and year, the expected number of deaths given the
state’s observed characteristics and the set of regulations. Summing these
predicted values in a given year and dividing by population will produce
a predicted estimate of the national fatality rate, which in practice is a very
accurate estimate. Next, we reconstruct this estimate for 1992, assuming
that the laws present in 1979 never changed, that is, assuming that belt-
use laws were never adopted and that those states with an MLDA under
twenty-one stayed at these levels through 1992.
Results from this simulation for passenger-vehicle fatalities among
eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds are presented in table 3.10. In the ﬁrst row
of the table, we report the actual percentage change in fatalities that we
observe between 1979 and 1992. In the next row, we present the predicted
change that would have happened had no belt-use laws been adopted. For
eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds, without a belt-use law, fatalities would
have fallen only 32.6 percent, meaning that ([38.4  32.6]/38.4 or) 15 per-
cent of the drop can be attributed to belt-use laws. Had MLDA laws stayed
at their 1980 values, the fatalities would have fallen by 36 percent, meaning
that MLDA law changes can explain only 6.3 percent of the reduction in
fatalities. Finally, the passage of belt-use laws and MLDA hikes can ex-
plain only 19.5 percent of the reduction in the fatality rate. The eﬀect of
the laws is not necessarily additive since this is a highly nonlinear model.
In table 3.11, we report model estimates for our alcohol-sensitive mea-
sure (nighttime fatalities) and daytime fatalities. In these models, we also
add the real beer tax as an alcohol-speciﬁc intervention. The results pre-
sented in this table suggest that, as expected, the eﬀect of MLDAs of eigh-
teen and nineteen is larger in the alcohol-speciﬁc regressions compared
Table 3.10 Percentage of Drop in 18–19-Year-Old Passenger-Vehicle-Fatality Rate
Explained by State Interventions
% Change in % of Change
Fatality Rate, Explained by
1979–92 Law Changes
Actual change 38.4
Predicted change with no adoption of belt-use laws 32.6 15.0
Predicted change with no increases to an MLDA
of 21 36.0 6.4
Predicted change with no adoption of belt-use laws
and no increases to an MLDA of 21 30.9 19.5
Teens and Traﬃc Safety 157to the samples shown in table 3.9 above. This suggests that the daytime/
nighttime counterfactual does function properly. The beer-tax results in
table 3.11 deserve special mention. Prior studies have documented strong
links between beer taxes, abusive teen drinking, and traﬃc fatalities. The
results presented in table 3.11 replicate this reduced-form evidence by im-
plying that increases in beer taxes would signiﬁcantly reduce the number
of teen traﬃc fatalities. However, several recent studies have suggested
that these links may be spurious (e.g., Dee, in press; Mast et al. 1999). In
part, this is because the direct links between beer taxes and the prevalence
of teen alcohol use have typically been based on cross-sectional identiﬁca-
tion strategies and are not robust to the inclusion of state ﬁxed eﬀects
(Dee 1999). But the reduced-form link between beer taxes and teen traﬃc
fatalities has proved robust even in two-way ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations
(e.g., Ruhm 1996). However, there are at least two reasons to be skeptical
about the validity of such inferences. One is that the estimated tax eﬀects
are implausibly large. For example, the estimated tax elasticity of night-
time traﬃc fatalities among sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds is roughly
0.23 (i.e., .448  .519). However, since beer taxes are only a fraction
Table 3.11 Conditional Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Fixed-Eﬀects Negative Binomial
Models for Teen Motor-Vehicle Fatalities, 1977–92 FARS
Passenger-Vehicle Fatalities
Nighttime Daytime
Independent Variable Mean 16–17 18–19 16–17 18–19
Mandatory seat-belt law, primary .107 .059 .081 .073 .062
enforcement (.038) (.034) (.049) (.047)
Mandatory seat-belt law, secondary .199 .055 .063 .015 .037
enforcement (.036) (.032) (.045) (.044)
MLDA of 18 .206 .018 .113 .078 .024
(.034) (.030) (.045) (.044)
MLDA of 19 .156 .034 .069 .069 .071
(.032) (.028) (.042) (.040)
MLDA of 20 .051 .031 .046 .059 .008
(.031) (.055) (.082) (.083)
Real state and federal excise taxes .519 .448 .697 .540 .530
on beer (.154) (.141) (.190) (.186)
65-MPH speed limit .306 .010 .006 .092 .002
(.048) (.041) (.063) (.060)
State unemployment rate 6.67 .010 .012 .030 .044
(.008) (.007) (.010) (.010)
Real per capita personal income 1.23 .038 .292 .227 .140
(00,000) (.171) (.152) (.226) (.223)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. There are 768 observations in each model (48 states
over 16 years). Each model includes state and year ﬁxed eﬀects and the natural log of the population
for the given age.
158 Thomas S. Dee and William N. Evans(roughly 10 percent) of the price of beer, this tax elasticity implies a sub-
stantially and implausibly larger price elasticity (roughly 2.3).28 As ec o n d
and perhaps more compelling type of evidence of the validity is based on
comparing the models of daytime and nighttime fatalities. The estimated
tax eﬀects are quite large and statistically signiﬁcant in the models of day-
time fatalities even though the rate of alcohol involvement in these fatalit-
ies is just a fraction of what it is at night. One explanation for why beer
taxes appear implausibly eﬀective in such models is that these tax variables
proxy for the unobserved trends speciﬁc to each state. The within-state
variation in nominal beer taxes is fairly limited, and the overall time-series
proﬁle in real taxes is smoothly declining in most states owing to price
inﬂation.29 Regardless, a conservative interpretation of this evidence is that
we should be substantially less sanguine than most of the prior literature
suggests about the possible lifesaving beneﬁts of higher beer taxes. In part,
this is because we simply have not had suﬃcient state-level experiences
with such tax changes to allow us to evaluate their eﬀects.
The remaining tables present evaluations of the key drunk-driving poli-
cies discussed earlier. These evaluations are based on data from the period
1982–97, when much of the relevant policy variation occurred.30 These
evaluations include regressors deﬁned as the interaction of administrative
license revocations with each of the three BAC variables: illegal per se at
0.08 BAC; illegal per se at 0.10 or higher BAC; and zero-tolerance laws. In
the absence of these interaction terms, most drunk-driving policies appear
ineﬀective (e.g., Ruhm 1996). However, the recent debate over 0.08 BAC
laws has underscored the claim that such laws are eﬀective largely through
their interaction with administrative license revocations (GAO 1999).31
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the sample variation is sometimes de-
ﬁned only for such interactions. In particular, in the case of 0.08 BAC laws,
the timing of their adoption was typically quite close to that of a regulation
allowing administrative license revocations (Dee, in press). Tables 3.12 and
3.13 present the results of these evaluations for all ten fatality counts.
These results suggest that illegal per se laws may generate large reductions
in traﬃc fatalities through their interaction with administrative license re-
vocations. For example, these results imply that the combination of a 0.08
28. Another reason to be skeptical of the implied price elasticity is that not all teen traﬃc
fatalities are alcohol related, implying that the eﬀects of the tax on drunk driving by teens
are even larger.
29. The beer-tax estimates are sensitive to including state-speciﬁc trends as regressors (e.g.,
Dee 1999). However, since this often removes much of the available sample variation, the
implied sensitivity is not clearly as meaningful as the results of the counterfactual estima-
tions.
30. Nonetheless, the MLDA, seat-belt law, and macroeconomic regressors are also in-
cluded. The beer-tax variable is omitted.
31. Since 1970, the NHTSA has advocated this sort of “systems approach” to reducing
drunk driving, one based on a combination of laws, enforcement, and public education.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.BAC law and administrative license revocations reduced passenger-vehicle
fatalities among eighteen- to nineteen-year-olds by 25 percent. It should
be noted that, although these estimated eﬀects are large, they are only
marginally signiﬁcant. However, these eﬀects are plausibly concentrated
in reductions of nighttime and not daytime fatalities. The results reported
in table 3.13 also suggest that these interactions were relatively more eﬀec-
tive for females than for males. The evidence from tables 3.12 and 3.13 also
suggests that zero-tolerance laws were typically ineﬀective either alone or
in concert with administrative license revocations. However, it should be
noted that these results may reﬂect a relative lack of enforcement.32
The other results reported in tables 3.12 and 3.13 provide little support
32. GAO (1999) notes that, in California, more underage drivers were prosecuted under
that state’s 0.08 BAC law than under its zero-tolerance law.
Table 3.13 Conditional Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Fixed-Eﬀects Negative Binomial
Models for Teen Motor-Vehicle Fatalities, 1982–97 FARS
Fatality Counts—Passenger Vehicles
Male Female
Independent Variable 16–17 18–19 16–17 18–19
Illegal per se at 0.08 BAC .050 .050 .036 .222
(.156) (.123) (.210) (.195)
 administrative license revocation .109 .204 .285 .412
(.187) (.150) (.252) (.234)
Illegal per se at 0.10 or higher BAC .066 .056 .039 .009
(.048) (.039) (.070) (.064)
 administrative license revocation .154 .136 .320 .181
(.108) (.089) (.148) (.138)
Zero-tolerance law .012 .031 .086 .013
(.040) (.034) (.054) (.052)
 administrative license revocation .051 .105 .065 .030
(.051) (.043) (.067) (.065)
Administrative license revocation .108 .157 .400 .134
(.112) (.092) (.153) (.143)
Dram-shop statute or case law .018 .022 .012 .096
(.047) (.039) (.064) (.061)
Mandatory jail time for ﬁrst DUI oﬀense .040 .057 .107 .093
(.046) (.039) (.062) (.060)
65-MPH speed limit .012 .017 .068 .075
(.044) (.036) (.061) (.058)
70-MPH speed limit .107 .036 .187 .221
(.075) (.064) (.099) (.097)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. There are 768 observations in each model (48 states
over 16 years). Each model includes state and year ﬁxed eﬀects, the natural log of the population for
the given age and/or gender, two seat-belt-law variables, three MLDA variables, the state unemploy-
ment rate, and the real state personal income per capita.
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shop case law or statutes, mandatory jail time for DUI oﬀenders) or sixty-
ﬁve-MPH speed limits had any detectable eﬀects. It is, however, not en-
tirely surprising that the initial movement to a sixty-ﬁve-MPH speed limit
had no detectable eﬀect among teens since these limits were restricted to
rural interstate roads, where such fatalities are rare. Interestingly, these
evaluations do suggest that the movement to maximum speed limits above
sixty-ﬁve MPH did signiﬁcantly increase counts of some teen traﬃc fatali-
ties. In particular, these large increases (12–20 percent) were concentrated
among the younger (sixteen- to seventeen-year-old) teens and among fe-
males.
3.4 Conclusions
Unfortunately for most parents, life begins for many teenagers when
they get their driver’s license. Teenagers travel upward of ten thousand
miles in an automobile per year, many of those behind the wheel as a
driver. As we illustrated here, parents have good reason to be alarmed.
Driving is an inherently risky activity, and teens’ inexperience and risk
taking make the problem even worse. Teen fatality rates are two to three
times those for adults aged twenty-ﬁve and older.
Teens are, on average, more aggressive drivers, are less likely to use
safety equipment such as seat belts, and are about as likely to drive drunk
as adults—even though no teens can legally drink. It is hard to disentangle
whether a high teen fatality rate is due to risk taking or inexperience be-
cause both variables change with age. Teen traﬃc fatalities are, however,
more a function of such driver behaviors than are fatalities among other
a g eg r o u p s .T e e n sh a v eah i g hf r e q u e n c yo fa c c i d e n t sw h e r ed r i v e re r r o r
or risk taking is the clear cause, such as single-vehicle crashes and vehicle
rollovers. This pattern of potential risk taking is consistent with other be-
haviors that we see among teens. The teens who do not wear their seat
belts or who drive after drinking are those teens who take other health
risks, like smoking, drinking, using drugs, and ﬁghting.
The situation has, however, improved considerably over the last twenty
years. When denominated by population, teen traﬃc fatalities have fallen
by about 37 percent since 1979. This decline is probably an underestimate
of the true improvements in traﬃc safety since teens are driving much
more today than they have in past years. Most of the decline seems to be
due to large reductions in alcohol-related fatalities. However, there have
also been substantive increases in occupant protection, owing primarily to
an increase in belt use and a move to heavier, more crashworthy automo-
biles.
Even with these important gains, traﬃc fatalities are still the leading
cause of mortality among teens and, by implication, a major concern for
162 Thomas S. Dee and William N. Evanshealth policy. However, there is cause for optimism. The U.S. experience
over the past twenty years has clearly demonstrated that traﬃc safety is
one area where government regulations can change important behaviors.
For example, the state-speciﬁc movement away from MLDAs of eighteen
has been associated with a drop in teen occupant fatalities of at least 5
percent. Furthermore, the widespread adoption of mandatory seat-belt
laws at the state level has substantially increased belt use among teens,
resulting in a 7–10 percent drop in teen occupant fatalities. More aggres-
sive enforcement of seat-belt laws could possibly generate further gains.
Additionally, these results suggest that drunk-driving policies like adminis-
trative license revocations may work in tandem with illegal per se laws that
establish explicit BAC limits to reduce alcohol-related fatalities among
teens. However, there is one possible and largely unexplored caveat to this
evidence of the lifesaving beneﬁts of certain government regulations. These
beneﬁts may be somewhat attenuated over the life cycle if traﬃc-safety
policies simply shift to older teens and young adults the experiential learn-
ing that occurs in risky settings. These beneﬁts may also be somewhat
limited because teens who take driving risks are substantially more likely
to be risk takers in other contexts as well.
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